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NATO's War in Kosovo and the Final Report to
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Aaron Schwabach
his Article addresses the report by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY9 concerning war crimes allegedly committed
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the conduct of its war with Yugoslavia.
International law regarding the conduct of war, orjus in bello, governs what are popularly thought
of as "war crimes." This body of law is currently influx; while the OTP is not in any sense a rule-
maling body, its actions may give some guidance as to the direction that the development of this
body of law willfollow.
The OTP considered NATO attacks on twenty-one targets in Yugoslavia as possible
violations ofexistingjus in bello norms. The OTP categorized the issues raised by the accusations
under the headings of environmental damage, use of depleted uranium projectiles, use of cluster
bombs, and improper target selection. The first and last categories have the potential for the
greatest impact on the fornation of normative expectations regarding the conduct of war. The
fourth problem can also be divided into two major subcategories: problems of discrimination and
problems ofproportionality.
In each instance, the OTP found that NATO's actions did not violate existing norms,
although in one instance the panel found itself divided. These outcomes were correct. The
reasoning underlying the outcomes, though, is troubling. The rules of law it states and applies
would exonerate not only NATO, but also the perpetrators offar more deliberate and destructive
acts. The OTP seems to ignore the development of the jus in bello during the past decade, and
perhaps during the past three decades. While the OTP is to be applauded for its decisions, its
report nonetheless contains troubling assumptions about current normative expectations relating
to the conduct of war.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 168
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO NATO's ALLEGEDLY
ILLEGALA CTS ................................................................................... 169
A. Scope of the OTP's Review ...................................................... 169
B. Sources oflnternational Law .................................................. 170
C. The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of War ................ 172
II. CATEGORIES OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS ........................................... 173
A. Use ofDepleted Uranium Projectiles and Cluster
B om bs ....................................................................................... 173
B. Damage to the Environment ................................................... 174
C. Problems Relating to Target Selection ................................... 176
1. Problems of Discrimination ........................................... 177
* Associate Professor of Law and Chair, Center for Global Legal Studies, Thomas
Jefferson School of Lav; J.D. 1989, Boalt Law School.
TULANE J OF 1NT'L & COMP. LAW
a. The Djakovica Convoy ........................................ 177
b. The Grdelica Gorge Bridge ................................. 178
c. The Chinese Embassy ......................................... 178
2. Problems of Proportionality ........................................... 180
a. The Village of Korisa .......................................... 180
b. The RTV Station ................................................. 181
IV. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................... 182
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1999 war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and Yugoslavia' has already had a significant effect on our
understanding of the law pertaining to the use of force, orjus ad bellum,
particularly as it relates to humanitarian intervention.' The war has also
brought renewed attention to the norms regarding the conduct of war, or
jus in bello. One recent example of this attention is the report by the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concerning war crimes allegedly
committed by NATO during the conduct of the war.3 On May 14, 1999,
while the war was still in progress, the ICTY's then-prosecutor, Louise
Arbour, established a committee to report on NATO's possible war
crimes.4 In August, she met with legal scholars from several countries to
discuss the allegations.5 The OTP's Final Report, issued on June 13,
2000, finds that none of the NATO actions complained of merits further
attention by the ICTY.
This blanket exoneration of NATO is something of a mixed
blessing. For those who have maintained that NATO's initiation of
hostilities against Yugoslavia was a justifiable humanitarian intervention,
1. The names "Kosovo" and "Yugoslavia" are used throughout this Article for
convenience only. Yugoslavia is used to refer to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Kosovo is
used to refer to the territory also known as Kosova or Kosovo and Metohija- No endorsement of
any political position is intended by the use of either term.
2. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N., and the Use ofForce, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1
(1999); Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NATO Bombing Operation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L. Rnv. 405 (1999); Aaron Schwabach, Humanitarian
Intervention and Environmental Protection: The Effect of the Kosovo War on the Law of War, 6
COLUM. J. E. EuR. L. (forthcoming 2000); NoAm CHOMSKY, THE NENW MimrrARY HUMANISM:
LESSONS FROM Kosovo 153 (1999).
3. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato06l3OO.htm (last visited June 19, 2000) [hereinafter Final
Report].
4. See Final Report, supra note 3, 3.
5. Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Court Is Looking at NATO; Prosecutor Reviews
Yugoslav Attacks, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 1999, at A-20, available at 1999 WL 30310811.
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there is some element of vindication in seeing NATO defendants
exonerated. But for those who had hoped to see the initiation of a legal
regime providing greater protection for civilians and the environment
during wartime, the Report seems to go too far. It bases its findings not
only on the facts, but also on interpretations of existing law that are more
restrictive than those that have been proposed since the 1991 Gulf War.
Those who are members of both groups may find the Final Report
somewhat disconcerting.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO NATO's ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL
ACTS
A. Scope of the OTP's Review
Under the terms of the statute of the ICTY,6 the ICTY's prosecutor
is not limited to investigating complaints from states, but "shall initiate
investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any
source, particularly from governments, United Nations organs,
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations."7 A number of
complaints were made to the prosecutor, many of them by the
government of Yugoslavia and by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).
The Final Report separates these complaints into two general
categories. In the first category are complaints that "as the resort to force
was illegal, all NATO actions were illegal[.]"'  Addressing these
complaints would have required the Tribunal, designed as a court of the
jus in bello and of international human rights law generally, to transfonn
itself into a court of thejus ad bellum. The Final Report notes that "the
legitimacy of the recourse to force by NATO is a subject before the
International Court of Justice,'" -a more proper forum for that particular
question. The Report also notes that "[tihe precise linkage between the
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is not completely resolved."'" The
question of whether waging an aggressive war (as NATO did in this
instance) is itself a crime was left open at Niirmberg, and has remained
open since.' The Report thus "refrain[s] from assessingjus ad bellum
issues," focusing "on whether or not individuals have committed serious
6. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) [hereinafter Security Council Resolution 808].
7. Id.; see also Final Report, supra note 3, 3.
8. Final Report, supra note 3, 2.
9. Id. 4.
10. Id. 32.
11. Id.
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violations of international humanitarian law as assessed within the
confines of thejus in bello."2
Violations of the jus in bello constitute the second category of
crimes of which NATO members were accused. Security Council
Resolution 808, which created the ICTY, applies to "all parties and
others concerned in the former Yugoslavia," which includes the United
States as well as the other NATO members.13 Resolution 808 is
concerned with human rights violations, and refers to "obligations under
international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949. ' ' 4 Although Resolution 808, unlike the Rome
Statute,"5 does not specifically mention environmental war crimes, the
Final Report addresses environmental accusations as well.
Having decided that the ICTY would have jurisdiction to consider
allegations ofJus in bello violations by non-Balkan NATO members, the
OTP then compiled a list of twenty-one targets in Yugoslavia that were
allegedly bombed or otherwise attacked in a manner violating existing
jus in bello norms. 6 The OTP categorized the issues raised by the
accusations under the headings of environmental damage, use of
depleted uranium projectiles, use of cluster bombs, and improper target
selection. 7 The last category included the greatest number of incidents,
and to some extent overlapped with the first.
B. Sources oflTnternational Law
In addressing these issues, the OTP considered both conventional
and customary international law. Conventional international law consists
of treaties and other international agreements. Of particular concern in
this instance is Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.18
Two of the NATO parties against whom allegations of war crimes
had been made are not parties to Protocol I. The allegations against these
countries, France and the United States, can only be considered under
12. Id. 34.
13. Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. See U.N. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
16. Final Report, supra note 3, 9.
17. Id. 14-39.
18. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 16 I.L.M. 1391, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977)
[hereinafter Protocol /]. A companion document, Protocol II, regulates armed conflicts which
are not international in character, and would thus be applicable to the conduct of the Serb forces
in Kosovo. 16 I.L.M. 1442, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977).
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customary international law, as can other allegations not covered by the
Geneva regime.
In the absence of applicable conventional law, rules of international
law may be derived from "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law."19 Customary law consists of those rules that,
although not formalized by international agreement, are followed by
states out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). "General
principles of law" have traditionally been seen as a third category of
public international law."0 However, general principles may also be
viewed as "supplemental rules" or a "secondary source of law."'
Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists are
merely a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."22 In
any event, judicial decisions, to the extent that a state actually observes
them, are state practice, and thus form a basis for normative
expectations.
A problem arises when considering what weight to give to the
practice of the ICTY itself. The ICTY, like the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and other international "courts," is not a stare decisis court.
Decisions of such courts are not mentioned as sources of international
law in article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ except, perhaps, as a subset
of "judicial decisions." Nonetheless, decisions of the ICJ and its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, are frequently
treated as definitive statements of international law. There is a tendency
to treat decisions of the ICTY similarly. The Final Report relies on two
ICTY decisions 23 and one ICJ decision.24
The Final Report itself does not enjoy similar status; it represents
the deliberations of an adversarial entity rather than an impartial decision
maker. While decisions of the ICTY tend to play an important role in the
formation of normative expectations, the actions of the OTP, in and of
19. Stat. of the Int'l Court of Justice art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1052 (1948). The statute is silent as to which nations are to be considered "civilized." If this
term still has any meaning, it would probably include those nations which make good faith efforts
to adhere to international human rights norms, while excluding those that engage in genocide,
ethnic cleansing, rape, and torture.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(4), § 102
Reporter's Note 7 (1987).
22. Stat. of the Int'l Court of Justice, supra note 19.
23. See Final Report, supra note 3, T 27 (citing Martic Rule 61 Hearing Decision, Trial
Chamber I, Mar. 8, 1996, No. IT-95-1 1-1, available at http://www.un.orglicty/ind-e.htm (last
visited July 15, 2000)); Final Report, supra note 3, 9 52 (citing the Kupreskic judgment, No. IT-
95-16-T, Jan. 2000, available at http://ww.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm
(last visited July 15, 2000)).
24. See Final Report, supra note 3, $T 15, 26 (citing Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 242, 31).
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themselves, do not. By controlling the types of cases which will be
brought before the ICTY, however, the OTP plays an important role in
determining the types of norms that will be formed. In this sense, the
Final Report may provide important insight into the future formation and
development of international human rights norms.
It seems reasonable to expect consistency from the OTP and, for
that matter, from other international criminal tribunals confronted with
similar situations. The Final Report shows that the OTP is concerned
with maintaining such consistency." This becomes particularly
important when addressing NATO's use of cluster bombs.26
C. The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of War
The body of law relating to the conduct of war is somewhat
artificially divided into the Hague and Geneva regimes-law arising
from the Hague Conventions of 189927 and 190728 and law arising from
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.29 With regard to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the OTP was concerned chiefly with Protocol I, a
1977 addition to the Geneva regime.30 The Hague Conventions are not
discussed specifically in the Final Report, but have become integrated
into the body of customary international law.
The fundamental principle of law relating to the conduct of war, as
set forth in the Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868 and reiterated many
times since, is that "the only legitimate object which states should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of
the enemy. '31 The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions provided that "the
25. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 3, 5 ("[T]he committee has applied the same
criteria to NATO activities that the Office of the Prosecutor [OTP] has applied to the activities of
other actors... [including] allegations of crimes committed by Serb forces in Kosovo.").
26. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text; see also Final Report, supra note 3,
27.
27. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
reprinted in JAMES BROWN ScoTr, THE HAGUE CONvENTIONs AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND
1907, at 100 (1918) [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
28. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,36
Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
29. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
30. See Protocol I, supra note 18.
3 1. William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 299,
303 (1993).
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right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited."'32 This principle, along with the remainder of the Hague
Conventions, has passed into the body of customary international law.33
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention, in turn, incorporates
customary international law in order to fill any lacunae in the treaty
regime governing state conduct during wartime."a Thus, the boundaries
between the Hague Conventions and customary international law are
fairly vague. Absent specific treaty provisions derogating from such
customary law, the Hague Conventions form the core of a uniform and
universally applicable body of customary international law relating to the
conduct of war.
Customary international law does, however, allow derogation from
certain norms in instances of military necessity.35 The use of the military
necessity exception is limited by the principles of proportionality,
humanity, discrimination, and chivalry. Two of these principles,
proportionality and discrimination, play a significant role in the Final
Report.36 Proportionality requires that the force used be proportional to
the desired objective.3 7 Discrimination requires that attackers distinguish
military targets from civilian ones.3"
Ill. CATEGORIES OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A. Use of Depleted Uranium Projectiles and Cluster Bombs
Accusations regarding NATO's use of depleted uranium projectiles
and cluster bombs were given fairly short shrift by the OTP. NATO used
depleted uranium projectiles and cluster bombs, but the use of these
munitions is not illegal.39 While the use of antipersonnel landmines may
32. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 27, art. 22; 1907 Hague Convention, supra note
28, art. 22.
33. See Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military
Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 CoLuM. J. ENvT'LL. 117 (2000).
34. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 28, pmbl.
35. See, e.g., United States v. List (Case 7), XI TRiALs OF WAR CIuMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREAMERG MiLrrARv TRBuNALS 759, 1296 (1948). See generally W. Hays Parks, Air War and
the Law of War, 32 A.F.L. REv. 1, 3 (1990).
36. See generally Final Report, supra note 3, 1 48-52, 69-89. Of the other two
principles, chivalry relates to the use of subterfuge, while humanity requires that military forces
avoid inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction beyond that actually necessary for the
accomplishment of legitimate military objectives.
37. See, e.g., Florencio Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use
of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" the International Laws ofArmed Conflict to
Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, I 1 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 793, 810 (1996).
38. See, id.
39. Depleted uranium tends to arouse a fair degree of anxiety whenever it is used, based
largely on a misunderstanding of its nature. The enormous adverse publicity which it attracts
would seem to outweigh its relatively limited benefits. The U.S. military, which used depleted
2001]
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be illegal under customary intemational law, the extension of this
prohibition to cluster bombs requires a double leap: First, it must be
accepted that antipersonnel landmines are in fact illegal under customary
international law, and second, it must be accepted that unexploded
bomblets from cluster mines fall within the definition of "antipersonnel
landmines." The OTP was unwilling to make this double leap. It also
took pains to distinguish the allegations made against NATO from those
made in the Martic case.4" In Martic, a rocket with a cluster bomb
warhead was fired into a civilian population center with the intent of
terrorizing the population.41 Thus, the illegality of the action resulted
from the nature of the target, rather than the weapon used. In contrast,
NATO's cluster bombs were used against military targets.42
B. Damage to the Environment
The OTP's discussion of damage to the environment provides the
greatest disappointment. Several of NATO's attacks, most notably the
attack on the petrochemical complex at Pancevo, resulted in the release
of stored toxic chemicals into the air and water.43 Although a report by
the U.N. Environment Programs (UNEP) later found "that the Kosovo
conflict has not caused an environmental catastrophe affecting the
Balkans region as a whole," it did find that "pollution detected at some
sites is serious and poses a threat to human health." Some, or even
most, of the pollution may have predated the NATO attacks.4"
The governing rules of conventional international law applied by
the OTP were articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I.46 Article 35(3)
prohibits the employment of "methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment." '47 Article 55 provides:
uranium munitions in Yugoslavia, has recently decided to phase out munitions made from highly
toxic but much less controversial lead. See Brass Hats Lead to Tungsten, ECONOMIST, July 31,
1999, at 68.
40. See Final Report, supra note 3, 27 (citing Martic Rule 61 Hearing Decision, Trial
Chamber I, Mar. 8, 1996, No. IT-95-1 1-1).
41. Martic Rule, supra note 23, 31; Final Report, supra note 3, 27.
42. Final Report, supra note 3, 27. If cluster bombs themselves were illegal, the nature
of the target would, of course, be irrelevant.
43. For a full discussion of the attack on Pancevo and related issues, see Schwabach,
supra note 33.
44. Final Report, supra note 3, 16 (quoting THE Kosovo CONFLICT: CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN S=tTIEMENs (1999), available at
http://wmwv.grid.unep.ch/btf/finallindex.html (last visited July 15, 2000) [hereinafter UNEP
Report]).
45. UNEP Report, supra note 44.
46. See Protocol I, supra note 18.
47. Id. art. 35(3).
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Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited.48
The OTP recognized that neither France nor the United States has
ratified Protocol I, but considered the possibility that article 55 in
particular might reflect customary international law, despite the ICJ's
contrary suggestion in Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.49
In applying the rules in articles 35(3) and 55, the OTP took an
extremely stringent view of the level of harm required to trigger the rule.
The Final Report notes that 'widespread, long-term, and severe' . .. is a
triple, cumulative standard[.]""s  This standard would not be met by
"ordinary battlefield damage of the kind caused to France in World War
I" because the harm "would need to be measured in years rather than
months."51
The OTP correctly found that NATO's actions did not rise to the
level of criminal conduct. In reaching this conclusion, however, the OTP
went much further than necessary in restricting the applicability of
Protocol I. In the six decades between the "ordinary battlefield damage"
caused to France in World War I and the promulgation of Protocol I,
enormous advances were made in humanity's understanding of the
environment. The OTP, however, is unwilling to find that the damage
caused by oil spills and fires in the Gulf War met the Protocol I
standard. 2 In the case of the Gulf War, the harm is far greater, and the
military utility many times less, than in the bombing of Pancevo. The
OTP's interpretation would seem to leave the environmental provisions
of Protocol I with almost no applicability.
The OTP's approach to Protocol I thus represents not a step forward
toward greater accountability for environmental damage during wartime,
but a step back to a pre-Gulf War standard. In reaching its conclusion,
the OTP relies in part on article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Statute of the
48. Id. art. 55.
49. Final Report, supra note 3, 15; Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24,
31.
50. Final Report, supra note 3.
51. Id.; cf Yuzon, supra note 37.
52. See Final Report, supra note 3, 15. The fires were set as reprisals, and thus were
prohibited under article 55(2) of ProtocolIeven if they did not cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage. However, the OTP does not make this observation.
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International Criminal Court, 3 making the astonishing declaration that
the statute is "an authoritative indicator of evolving customary
international law on this point."54  This solidarity among current and
future international criminal tribunals is perhaps to be expected, but it
has the unfortunate effect of excusing almost all environmental damage
caused by war. A broader interpretation of Protocol I still would have
exonerated NATO. The mere fact that it is difficult or impossible to
distinguish damage caused by NATO's actions from preexisting damage
should have been sufficient.
The bombing of Pancevo was thus considered as simply another
problem of target selection, and discussed under the customary
international law principle of proportionality.
C. Problems Relating to Target Selection
The majority of the incidents resulting in complaints against NATO
to the OTP were incidents in which questions of discrimination and/or
proportionality were raised. The bombing of Pancevo, although
resulting in no deaths, caused damage to the environment. In deciding
that the damage caused was not disproportional to the military advantage
gained, the OTP invoked the famous example of General Rendulic's
scorched earth policy in Norway. Tried at Nirmberg, Rendulic was
acquitted of the charge of wanton devastation. His belief that there was a
military necessity for his actions, even though incorrect, was not
unreasonable and was a sufficient defense.55 Proportionality is thus
determined by a "reasonable military commander" standard. 6
Most of the other incidents complained of could be similarly
dismissed. Five incidents, however, caused particular concern to the
OTP: attacks on a passenger train, a refugee convoy, a radio and
television station in Belgrade, the Chinese Embassy, and the village of
Korisa. Each of these incidents received considerable media attention,
mostly negative, at the time it occurred. Three of the targets-the
53. ROME STAT. ON THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998). At
the time of this writing (August 2000), the statute has been signed by ninety-seven countries,
including most of the NATO members (although not the United States). It has been ratified by
only twelve: Belize, Fiji, France, Ghana, Iceland, Italy, Norway, San Marino, Senegal, Tajikistan,
Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela. Of these twelve, only France and Italy were directly
involved in the war with Yugoslavia. The statute will not enter into force until some time after it
has been ratified or otherwise accepted by at least sixty countries. For more information, see
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as of 12 August 1999, available at
http://www.un.org/law/iccstatute/status.htm (last visited July 14, 2000).
54. Final Report, supra note 3, 21.
55. See United States v. List, supra note 35, at 1296.
56. See Final Report, supra note 3, 50; see also id. 28(b).
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passenger train, the refugee convoy, and the Chinese Embassy-were
destroyed more or less by accident, and thus present primarily problems
of discrimination. The other two-the radio/television station and the
village of Korisa-were targeted, and thus present primarily problems of
proportionality.
1. Problems of Discrimination
Military commanders are required to direct combat operations
against military objectives, and to take measures to ensure that targets
attacked are in fact military objectives. 7 A military commander may
violate this requirement by reckless or intentional conduct, but simple
negligence will not suffice.
a. The Djakovica Convoy
NATO bombers destroyed civilian vehicles on several occasions,
believing them to be military. In the most tragic of these incidents,
between seventy and seventy-five ethnic Albanian refugees were killed
when NATO planes attacked a convoy fleeing Djakovica. 8 The NATO
forces were responding to reports that Serb forces were burning ethnic
Albanian villages in the Djakovica region5 9 and discontinued their attack
as soon as they became aware of the presence of civilians. 0
The practice of NATO air forces throughout the war was to fly at
altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet, out of reach of Yugoslavian anti-
aircraft weaponry. Although this was not in itself reckless, it is difficult
to determine the exact nature of a target on the ground from an altitude of
three miles. The aircrews were thus forced to rely on instruments and
intelligence reports in identifying targets. As a result of the Djakovica
tragedy, NATO became "very, very cautious about striking objects
moving on the roads,"'6 and altered its rules of engagement to prohibit
attacks on military vehicles when intermixed with civilian vehicles. In
the case of Djakovica, the OTP found no difficulty in declaring that a
reckless act had not occurred, especially in light of the immediate halt to
the attack as soon as the presence of civilians was reported.
57. See id. 28.
58. See id. 63-70.
59. Id. 65.
60. Id. 69.
61. Id. 68.
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b. The Grdelica Gorge Bridge
The destruction of the Leskovac railroad bridge at Grdelica Gorge,
however, was more worrisome. Just after the NATO pilot charged with
destroying the bridge fired his first missile, a train entered the bridge. At
that point it was impossible to recall or disable the missile, which struck
the train rather than the bridge. The pilot then circled around and fired a
second missile at the other end of the bridge. At the time he fired the
second missile, the bridge was obscured by smoke. The train had
continued to move forward, and was struck by the second missile as
well. 6
2
The OTP had no difficulty deciding that the damage caused by the
first missile was an unavoidable accident.63 While this conclusion seems
reasonable, it also appears that the release of the second missile showed
remarkably poorjudgment.
In reaching its conclusion, the OTP considered both the explanation
offered by NATO General Wesley Clark and a report by Ekkehard Wenz,
a German critic of NATO's actions.' Clark testified that the pilot's only
clue to the train's arrival was a very tiny point on a five-inch video
screen. This seems to beg the question: If the pilot's instrumentation is
inadequate, is it not reckless for him to fire at targets he can not actually
see?
The OTP ignored this issue, however, focusing on the second
bomb, which was fired into a cloud of smoke. The location of the train
could not be determined either by eye or by instrument, but the pilot
knew that the train was somewhere on the bridge. Of all of NATO's
actions evaluated by the OTP, the firing of the second bomb comes the
closest to recklessness, and the OTP committee found itself divided on
the question.6' Nonetheless, the OTP recommended no further
investigation of the incident.66
c. The Chinese Embassy
The July 5, 1999, destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
differed from the preceding two incidents in that it directly injured a
neutral country. The error occurred earlier in the target selection process
than the errors at Djakovica and Grdelica Gorge. More than two months
before the bombing, the building housing the embassy had been
62. Id. 59.
63. See id. 61-62.
64. Id.
65. Id. 62.
66. Id.
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incorrectly identified as the Yugoslavian Federal Directorate for Supply
and Procurement. 7 The target selection review process relied on
incorrect information originally supplied by the United States National
Imaging and Mapping Agency.68 In an instance such as this, where the
original information was incorrect, the review process served merely to
revalidate the original error.69
The bombing of the embassy killed three people and damaged
relations between China and the NATO members, particularly between
China and the United States. The United States Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the U.S. government apologized to the Chinese
government and agreed to pay more than $30 million in compensation.7"
One CIA employee was dismissed, and six were reprimanded.7
The Final Report recommends "that the OTP should not undertake
an investigation concerning the bombing of the Chinese Embassy."'72
However, the reasoning behind this conclusion is somewhat disturbing.
The OTP first determined that "the aircrew involved in the attack should
not be assigned any responsibility for the fact that they were given the
wrong target.' 7 3 This seems only fair. At 11:50 p.m., when the bombs
were released, the Chinese Embassy would have been one large,
darkened building among many, and its nature would not have been
apparent even to a fairly close observer. In contrast to the situation at
Grdelica Gorge, the true nature of the target did not become apparent
immediately after launching the first bomb.
The Final Report also states, however, that "it is inappropriate to
attempt to assign criminal responsibility for the incident to senior leaders
because they were provided with wrong information by officials of
another agency."'74 This is deeply disturbing, as it suggests that wherever
the decision making process is sufficiently diffuse, individual
responsibility vanishes. Although the Report notes approvingly that the
"U.S. government also claims to have taken corrective actions in order to
assign individual responsibility[J,]" '7 it is difficult to see what incentive
the United States has to pursue such a course. By "assigning individual
responsibility," the United States will expose its officials to possible
67. See id. 81-82.
68. See id. 83.
69. See id.
70. Id. 84.
71. Id.
72. Id. 85.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. 84.
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criminal prosecutions. By keeping the process diffuse, the officials may
continue to avoid responsibility.
There were valid political and diplomatic reasons to avoid a
prosecution in the Chinese Embassy case. The two countries most
directly involved, China and the United States, had already reached a
diplomatic resolution.76 Prosecution in the ICTY might have endangered
that resolution, as well as reduced the incentive for states (as opposed to
individuals) to take responsibility for similar actions in the future. In
addition, as China was not a party to the conflict, the exacerbation of
international tensions that would result from dragging the matter through
the ICTY would probably outweigh any benefit.
The ICTY, of course, is not subject to the same jurisdictional limits
as the ICJ, which can consider only actions brought by states. In one
model of international relations, an international criminal tribunal should
play the same role in reducing war crimes that a municipal criminal
tribunal plays in reducing street crimes. When, for example, gang
members assassinate a member of a rival gang and then pay
compensation to the victim's family, municipal courts do not say, "Well,
they've paid for the damages, so let's not bring criminal charges."
To extend this analogy to international criminal tribunals, however,
would assume a degree of normativeness in international law that does
not currently exist. Under present conditions, where the parties to a
dispute are able to reach a mutually agreeable solution on their own, it
seems preferable to allow them to do so, even if the ritual bloodletting on
the part of the wrongdoer amounts to no more than the sacking of a
solitary CIA scapegoat.
2. Problems of Proportionality
The attacks on the village of Korisa and on the Belgrade Radio and
Television (RTV) station presented problems of proportionality. Each
caused a relatively large number of civilian deaths in the course of
achieving a relatively minor military advantage.
a. The Village of Korisa
The May 14, 1999, bombing of Korisa killed as many as eighty-
seven civilians. At the time, it appears that NATO was unaware of the
presence of civilians in Korisa, which was also the site of legitimate
military targets.77 The civilians who were killed may have been
returning refugees, or may have been illegally confined by the
76. See id.
77. See id. 86-89.
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Yugoslavian military as "human shields." '78 The large number of civilian
casualties seems to outweigh the military advantage gained; however, it
does not appear that NATO intended to cause the casualties or was even
aware that they might occur.
b. The RTV Station
The April 23, 1999, bombing of the Belgrade Radio and Television
(RTV) station killed between ten and seventeen people. Although the
RTV station was a civilian broadcasting station, military and civilian
broadcasting systems in Yugoslavia were inextricably intertwined.
Military communications were often routed through civilian systems,
and vice versa.79
The military advantage gained, however, was extremely slight. The
communications functions of the RTV station were interrupted for only a
few hours.8" The attack came at 2:20 a.m.,8 a time when military
communications traffic is probably less than in the daytime, and when
civilian viewership is probably virtually nonexistent. The loss of a few
pre-dawn hours of broadcasting hardly seems to justify the loss of ten or
more human lives.
The destruction of the RTV station also involved an issue of
discrimination. Unlike the issues in the Djakovica and Chinese Embassy
bombings, and possibly the Grdelica Gorge bombing, the problem arose
from a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact. British, American,
and NATO leaders announced that civilian media stations such as RTV
were targeted because, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
the media "is the apparatus that keeps [Milosevic] in power and we are
entirely justified ... in damaging and taking on those targets."82 Two
weeks earlier, NATO had indicated that television stations would not be
bombed if they included six hours of uncensored Western programming
each day at specified hours."
The irony here, that the self-appointed defenders of freedom were
threatening to destroy anyone who broadcast sentiments with which they
disagreed, is rather stark. The OTP commented rather sharply on this:
"At worst, the Yugoslav government was using the broadcasting
networks to issue propaganda supportive of its war effort: a
78. Id. 89.
79. Id. 72.
80. See id. 78.
81. Id. 71.
82. Id. 74.
83. Id.
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circumstance which does not, in and of itself, amount to a war crime[.]"84
It concluded, however, that "NATO's targeting of the [RTV] building for
propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its
primary goal of disabling the Serbian military command and control
system[.]" 5 The OTP returned to contemplation of the proportionality
problem after giving a mild warning that "if the attack on the [RTV] was
justified by reference to its propaganda purpose alone, its legality might
well be questioned by some experts in the field of international
humanitarian law. '8
6
Killing ten people, let alone seventeen, to shut off a few hours of
late-night television broadcasting seems disproportionate. The OTP
solved this problem by introducing the idea that "[tihe proportionality or
otherwise of an attack should not necessarily focus exclusively on a
specific incident."87 Through this casualty-averaging method, the deaths
resulting from the attack on the RTV station could "be seen as... part of
an integrated attack against" the entire Yugoslav radio relay network.88
As with many of the OTP's other approaches in the Final Report, this
extends further than necessary for this particular case. Casualty
averaging seems to indicate that almost no single incident involving
civilian deaths can ever be disproportionate unless it is part of a larger
pattern of incidents involving excessive civilian deaths.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The OTP's Final Report seems to close the door to any prosecutions
of NATO actors before the ICTY for acts committed during the Kosovo
conflict. To this extent, it is to be applauded. NATO's missteps during
the war were acts of misfeasance rather than malfeasance, and in no way
compare to the deliberate transgressions against international human
rights norms by Yugoslavia before and during the war. The current
prosecutor, Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, has stated that investigating
NATO's possible wrongdoings is "not my priority, because I have
inquiries about genocide, about bodies in mass graves."89
84. Id. 76. The OTP distinguished the situation in Yugoslavia from one in which radio
broadcasts serve not to support the war effort but to incite the commission of genocide: "If the
media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely
disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target." Id.
947.
85. Id. 76.
86. Id.
87. Id. 78; see also id. 52.
88. Id. 78.
89. Jerome Socolovsky, NATO Bombing Conduct Probed, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
Dec. 28, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28153769; see also Trueheart, supra note 5, at A-20.
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Measured against the scale of the atrocities which have occurred
within the last decade in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's errors in the
Kosovo conflict were small. NATO committed no "war crimes" or
violations of thejus in bello during its bombing campaign.
The continuing presence of NATO and Russian troops presents the
ongoing possibility of violations of international criminal law. In the
most appalling example, an eleven-year-old Kosovar Albanian girl,
Meritas Shabiu, was raped, tortured, and murdered in January 2000. A
U.S. Army Staff Sergeant, Frank Ronghi, has been arrested for the crime
and his trial before a U.S. military court began on July 31, 2000.90 Such
a crime, committed by a soldier of an occupying force against a civilian
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, would be within the mandate of
Resolution 808.
Several points in the Final Report, though, suggest that the ICTY is
willing to consider only the most serious violations of international law.
The OTP's report does not provide truly satisfactory resolutions to the
issues presented by the second bomb at Grdelica Gorge, the Pancevo
bombing, the Chinese Embassy bombing, and the destruction of the
RTV station.
The firing of the second bomb at the Grdelica Gorge bridge would
certainly be considered "reckless" by municipal criminal and tort law
standards. The OTP's reading of Protocol I also sets an extremely high
standard for environmental damage caused by war. While it seems
evident, especially in light of the UNEP task force report,9 that NATO's
action was not illegal, it seems almost equally evident that Iraq's action
in setting fire to the oil wells of Kuwait was an environmental crime.92
The OTP, however, seems unwilling to entertain even this possibility.93
The Final Report also contains two disturbing ideas. The first,
arising in the context of the Chinese Embassy bombing, is that individual
government officials can avoid criminal liability if the decision making
process is sufficiently decentralized. The U.S. government presented
two reasons for the accidental targeting of the embassy: "The dog ate
90. See American Soldier to Be Tried for Kosovo Murder, REUTERS NnwswiRE, June 26,
2000, available at http://dailynews.yahoo.comh/nm/20000626/ts/soldier trial dc l.html (last
visited July 6, 2000). On August 1, 2000, after pleading guilty, Ronghi was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole. See US. Peacekeeper Gets Life in Prison: Slain Girl's
Dad Says "We Have Seen Justice Work", cfu. TRm., Aug. 2, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL
3692616.
91. UNEP Report, supra note 44.
92. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)
(imposing liability on Iraq for damages, including environmental harm, inflicted on Kuwait
during the Gulf War).
93. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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our homework" (or, more precisely, "we were using the old map") and
"nobody's in charge here." The first excuse is absurd. Surely few
professors would be inclined to sympathize with a student who failed to
hand in an assignment on time because he or she was relying on the
previous year's syllabus. The second excuse encourages governments to
disperse decision making functions to a sufficient degree to allow each
official to maintain plausible deniability, without simultaneously
providing an incentive to develop safeguards against mistakes such as
the targeting of the Chinese Embassy.
The second disturbing idea embedded in the Final Report is the idea
of casualty-averaging. By excusing the high civilian death toll from the
RTV bombing on the grounds that the overall loss of life from attacks on
communications facilities was low, the OTP seems to be disregarding a
fundamental principle of international human rights law: that human
lives have value not only in the aggregate but also in the individual. The
murder of Merite Shabiu was no less a crime simply because no others
lost their lives. If the loss of life at the RTV station was disproportionate
to the military advantage gained, it was disproportionate even if no lives
were lost at other television stations attacked by NATO.94 Article
8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which the OTP considers "an
authoritative indicator of evolving customary international law"'95 (at
least in some areas), prohibits "[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians ... which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
' 96
"An attack" would seem to mean a single act against a single
objective. Any other definition creates a slippery slope ending in the
conclusion that, since the loss of life during the war as a whole was not
disproportionately high, no incident in the war violated the principle of
proportionality. The reverse would also be true: If the civilian casualties
in the war as a whole were disproportionately high, every action taken by
the casualty-causing side during the war would be a war crime, which is
an equally absurd result.
None of the NATO actions evaluated by the OTP should form the
basis for a war crimes prosecution. The Final Report, however,
introduces a great deal of legal reasoning going far beyond that necessary
to support its conclusion. The decade since the Gulf War has seen a
tremendous flowering of theories regarding the increasing protection of
94. See ROME STAT., supra note 53.
95. Final Report, supra note 3, 21; see also supra note 54.
96. ROME STAT., supra note 53, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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civilians, civilian objects, and the environment during wartime. The
Final Report takes a more traditional, restrictive view of the law in this
area, which may be indicative of future trends in the field.

